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1. INTRODUCTIO'N 
For the negotiations on a Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) to be 
successful, participating countries must have the political motivation and 
the economie capability to liberalize their trade and ïncfustrialization 
regime. The objective of our study of the syndrome of protectionism is 
to assess the feasibility of such a multilateral liberalization effort. 
Many countries have attempted to liberalize their trade and industrialization 
regime and to reduce the anti-trade bias in the incentive system. However, 
due to the economie and political complexity of policy reform, many such 
attempts have failed. Case histories show that periods of liberalization 
may be succeeded by a return to protectionist poli ei es. Also, collective 
efforts to liberalize the trade regime within the framework of a regional 
free trade area or a customs union have failed frequently, due to the unequal 
capacity of participating countries to liberalize, and the uneven distribu-
tion of "gains" in export markets and "losses" through import competition. 
Particularly in developing countries, government and industrial producers 
are highly dependent for their income on the prevailing system of trade 
barriers. Such a state of affairs turns a liberalization plan into a 
sensitive economie and political issue. The more a country's trade and 
liberalization regime is characterized by protectionism and the more its 
economie performance is affected by its protectionist poli ei es, the stronger 
the resistance against liberalization is likely to be. 
The syndrome of protectionism is studied by means of principal component 
analysis. This technique has been applied to explore patterns in the 
behaviour of variables that are supposed to be affected by trade policy. 
The analysis is based on 11 such variables. From these 11 variables we 
extract three principal components. According to their scoring on these 
principal components, countries will be classified and clustered. The study 
is organized along the following lines. In section 2 we shall discuss the 
extent of government intervention in the trade regime in developing countries. 
In section 3 we shall analyse the syndrome of protectionism by means of 
principal component analysis. In section 4 we shall study the scoring of 
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countries on the principal component and subdivide countries accordingly. 
In section 5 we shall focus in particular on the performance of large coun-
tries and of low-income countries, two groups of countries that play a 
special rol e in any group-wise liberali zation effort among' developing coun-
tries. Finally we shall present in section 6 the results of additional 
analysis based pn a somewhat reduced sample from which countries with 
exceptional natura! wealth have been excluded. 
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2. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE TRADE REGIME 
2.1 Some general observations on protection and the propensity to liberalize 
It is the type of government intervention rather than the extent of it whïch 
is typical of developing countries. Laissez-faire, or government abstinence 
from intervention, is a rare phenomenon in both the group of developed and 
developing countries. The distinction between the two groups of countries 
is in the way the government sector is financed and domestic activities 
are stimulated. Characteristic for the trade and industrialization regimes 
of most developing countries is the lack of free trade. The core of the 
trade-intervention system is the complex of administrative measures and 
taxes to control imports, while the regulation of exports, at least of 
manufactures, is less predominant. 
Within the group of developing countries there are, nevertheless, wide 
differences in the way government ïntervenes in the trade sector. In every 
country a different mix of administrative and price regulations is in force 
and there is no way to classify countries in a straightforward fashion 
according to the degree trade is controlled by government. The system of 
trade control measures is complex, opaque and difficult to entangle. Con-
sequently, its full impact on the size of the trade sector is hard to 
estimate. The studies by Bhagwati and Krueger et al. of the instruments 
in use to control trade show the difficulty to determine accurately the 
nature of the trade regime and its impact on the trade performance.1 
The distinction into five broad categories of regimes - ranging from regimes 
characterized by quantitative controls to regimes characterized by price 
controls - certainly provides insight into the level of sophistication of 
government intervention, its market orientation, and also into the interests 
that government, industry and rent-seekers have in the prevailing system 
of controls. The same studies, however, show the limitations of such a 
classification scheme to determine the capacity of government to sustain 
a market-oriented and liberalized trade regime. Countries reiterate the 
process of transforming their trade regime from an administratively controlled 
regime towards a regime relying on price signals, and the experience with 
unilateral, regional, and world-wide liberalization efforts shows that 
regime transformation is not simply a one-way process. 
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Governments may have a preference for protectionist measures for many 
different reasons. Any attempt to liberalize trade in a concerted manner 
through a multilateral rul e system that bypasses the factors underlying 
the prevailing system of administrative and price controls runs a great 
risk of failure. 
Protection may be based on society's preference for relative autonomy and 
independence of world markets. Also, the application of trade control 
measures may be due to the lack of alternative efficiënt instruments to 
realize objectives of economie policy with respect.to industrial production 
and employment, or the balance-of-payments position.2 Also, the selection 
of this particular type of policy may emanate from the claims of lobby 
groups that have interests in reducing international competition, raising 
domestic prices and licensing of imports.3 
These factors determine if and to what extent liberalization results in a 
potential increase in welfare for society as a whole. If society has a 
collective preference for trade suppression, protection cum export taxation 
is first-best policy and there is no rationa!e for liberalization whatsoever 
(Bhagwati).4In case society has a preference for a specific amount of 
industry - the case of industry as a public good - direct stimuiation of 
such activity by means of a subsidy may be preferable over protecting it, 
but protection may be preferable over liberalization. However, in case 
stimuiation through domestic tax collection and subsidy disbursement is less 
cost efficiënt than raising taxes on imports, protection may be first-best 
policy. 5 
In the short term, actual welfare effects of liberalization may be below 
their potential value due to adjustment costs and dislocation costs of 
liberalization. Si nee machinery, production and commercial knowledge, and 
physical and commercial infrastructure are industry and market specific 
and not a kind of homogenous putty, adjustment to liberalization entails 
relocation costs due to the need to create new efficiënt combinations of 
factors of production. Given the inadequacy of the general economie atmosphere 
that underlies the case of general protection of industry in a developing 
country, the limited capacity to subsidize training and to develop a 
commercial infrastructure for export industries, these relocation costs 
may be substantial. This holds particularly for countries where industry is 
in its infant stage and an export-oriented infrastructure including trans-
portation, distribution and market-rèconnaissance networks have not yet 
been developed. Additionally, dislocation costs may occur in case fixed 
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prices of factors of production such as sticky wages prevent an adequate 
adjustment to changes in relative product prices due to liberalization.6 
Resistance against liberalization is not necessarily limited to the groups 
in society directly affected by it such as industrialists and labourers 
in the liberalized sector, or rent-seekers. Domestic resistance may be 
widespread when society has come to be characterized by a conservative 
welfare function and protection functions as an "insu.rance policy". Under 
such circumstances speciffc claims for prolongation of protection are supported 
generally for the sake of self-interest.7 
Not unlikely, liberalization may result in a temporary worsening of the 
trade baiance in countries with a poorly developed export sector. In the 
context of import liberalization through tan'ff reduction the factors causing 
the so-called J-curve effect of a devaluation on the trade position may be 
just as relevant here. Again, this hol ds particularly for low-income coun-
tries with a high dependence of industry on protection and a poorly developed 
infrastructure for export industries. 
Given the vested interests in the prevailing trade and industrialization 
regime, and the balance-of-payments and debt-servicing difficulty many 
countries experience, there is an inclination to limit the liberalization 
of the trade regime to the extent necessary to acquire technology and vital 
inputs for export industries only, and to preserve to the maximum the 
domestic market for domestic industry. Such an approach of fragmented 
liberalization, or, to phrase it more accurately, export-reiated-import 
liberalization, has been implemented in several countries. 
A dual approach to liberalization reduces the adjustment and dislocation 
costs of import competition and the politica! risks for government to 
conflict with vested interests, while it creates a delimited 'free trade' 
area for export industries that are stimulated in this way to contribute 
to the improvement of the trade baiance. ünder such circumstances negotiations 
on liberalization in a multilateral framework take the form of each 
participant seeking for export opportunities while minimizing so-called 
import concessions. 
All this, however, does not invalidate that a strong multilateral rule system 
based on fairness and substantial concessions is, in itself, a factor 
supporting liberalization attempts in participating countries. Guaranteed 
concessions of potential trading partners contribute to the reduction of 
the potential short-term costs of liberalization and create therefore a 
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context conducive to liberalization as compared to a unilateral attempt 
to liberalization in a protectionist multilateral system. 
To realize a fair distribution of costs and gains of liberalization, 
concessions must be differentiated according to the capacity of countries 
to make concessions and their potential to reap gains from trade through 
export expansion. Moreover, to have a substantial impact on trade and welfare, 
countries with a large domestic market in particular must participate in 
multilateral negotiations and offer sizeable cuts in trade barriers. 
2.2 Cross-country analysis of government intervention in the trade regime 
The contribution of taxes on international trade and transactions to total 
tax revenue is presented in figure 1 for a sample of 68 developed and 
developing countries. As indicated earlier, a relatively high dependence 
on import duties for the financing o'f government spending is typical of 
developing countries, whereas in most developed countries the contribution 
of duties on international transactions to total government revenue is 
negligible. 
The rol e of import duties in government finance and in the stimulation of 
domestic activities in countries at different levels of development and 
with different opportunities for domestic-market-oriented poli ei es is 
studied in a cross-section analysis, the results of which are presented 
below. These results show that the lower the leve! of development of a 
country, the hi'gher import duties, the larger the contribution of taxes 
on international transactions to total tax revenue, and the more government 
is dependent on import duties for its total revenue. 
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Figure 1 Taxes on international transactions (1980) 
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Sources: data on GDP per capita taken from UNCTAD, Handbook of International 
Trade and Development Statistics, Supplement 1983, United Nations, New York, 
1983, table 6.1, and United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 
1981, Volume I, New York, 1983. Data on government revenue taken from IMF, • 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, Volume VIII, Washington DC, 1984. 
Exchange rates taken from IMF, International Financial statistics, 
Volume XXXVII, Number 11, Washington DC, 1984. 
- 8 -
Table 1. Taxes on international transactions, protection and government 
revenue, 1980. 
Dependent 
variables 
Constant 
term 
GDP/P p n R2 
'f/M 3.75* 
(3.32) 
-.67* 
(6.79) 
-.15 
(1.94) 
68 .42 
T /T 7.95* 
(6.90) 
-.86* 
(8.56) 
-.39* 
(4.85) 
68 .57 
•F/GR 6.66* 
(6.21) 
-.82* 
(8.75) 
-.33* 
(4.42) 
68 .57 
f/. 'M 
t , T /T 
Symbols: GDP/P = Gross Domestic Production per capita in US dollars. 
P = size of population in thousands of inhabitants. 
= ratio of total import duty revenue (T ) to the value 
of total imports (Af) . 
= contribution of taxes on international trade and trans-
actions (T ) to total tax revenue (T). 
T/GR = contribution of import duty revenue (T ) to total govern-
ment revenue (GR). 
Notes : equations are in doublé In-form. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
An asterisk (*) indicates that the variable is statistically significant at 
a 95 per cent confidence interval. 
Sources: data on GDP and population taken from UNCTAD, Handbook of Inter-
national Trade and Development Statistics, Supplement 1983, United Nations, 
New York, 1983, table 6.1, and United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics 1981, Volume I, New York, 1983. Data on imports taken from UNCTAD, 
ibidem, table 6.IA. Data on government revenue taken from IMF, Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook, Volume VIII, Washington DC, 1984. 
Exchange rates taken from IMF, International Financial Statistics, volume 
XXXVII, Number 11, Washington DC, 1984. 
Table 2 shows the impact of taxes on imports on the size of trade flows. 
In the upper part of the table the trade-policy related variables duties on 
total imports and imports of manufactures are included in an equation used 
in studies on pattern in development by Chenery et al.8 As shown in the 
upper part of the table tariffs reduce significantly the values of imports 
and exports. The lower part of the table shows in a different manner the 
impact of protection on the market orientation of manufacturing. Tariffs 
on imports stimulate import substitution and create an anti-export bias. 
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Tab!e 2. Protection and trade. 
Protection and the value of trade per capita (1980) 
Const 
variables term 
2 
DeDendent tant GDP/P P T/M n R 
Developed and developing 
countries 
M/P -4.45 
(6.59) 
.86 
(12.51) 
-.-34 
(7.35) 
-.14 
(2.76) 
M /P 
m 
-4.77 
(7.37) 
.85 
(12.90) 
-.36 
(8.23) 
-.14 
(2.74) 
E/P -6.22 
(6.92) 
1.00 
(10.90) 
-.30 
(4.86) 
-.15 
(2.14) 
E /P 
m 
-12.40 
(7.59) 
1.40 
(8.40) 
-.17 
(1.50) 
-.23 
(1.83) 
Developing countries ^ 
only 
M/P -4.83 
(5.43) 
.81 
(9.29) 
'.32 
(5.80) 
-.40 
(2.91) 
M /P 
m 
-4.80 
(5.67) 
.78 
(9.41) 
-.36 
(6.78) 
-.34 
(2.65) 
E/P -7.01 
(5.97) 
.95 
(8.21) 
-.26 
(3.53) 
-.51 
(2.83) 
E /P 
m 
-13.00 
(5.97) 
1.27 
(5.93) 
-1.12 
(0.92) 
-.75 
(2.24) 
59 .89 
59 .89 
59 .84 
59 .74 
49 .86 
49 .87 
49 .81 
49 .'65 
Protection, import substitution and the anti-export bias (1977) 
Cons 
variables term 
Dependent tant DD T^/M n R 
m m 
Developed and developing 
countries 
M /DD 1.03 -.07 -.05 54 .57 
m m
 (10.70) (8.27) (3.53) 
E /o .39 -.01 -.05 54 .25 
m m
 (4.09) (1.71) (4.10) 
Symbols: M = value of total imports. 
M = value of imports of manufactures. 
E = value of total exports. 
E = value of exports of manufactures. 
dB = value of domestic demand for manufactures DD = O -E + M 
„ m , r. ^ .
 £ c . m m m m O = value of output of manufactures. 
other symbols as of table 1 
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Notes : Equations in upper part of table are in doublé In-farm, equations 
in lower part are in semi In-form. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
An asterisk (*') indicates that the variable is statistically significant 
at a 95 per cent confidence interval. 
Sources: data on GDP and population as of table 1. Data on imports and exports 
taken from UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 
United Nations, New York, several issues. Data on tariff revenue taken from 
IMF, Government Finance Statistics, Washington DC, several issues. Data on 
values of manufacturing output taken from United Nations, Yearbook of 
Industrial Statistics, 1981 Edition, Volume 1, New York, 1983. Exchange 
rates taken from IMF, International Financial Statistics, Washington DC, 
several issues. 
In the previous quantitative analysis as wel! as in all analyses to come 
that are related to the syndrome of protectionism in developing countries, 
tariffs are used as a proxy for protection. Admittedly, tariffs are only 
one of many devices government may apply to manage import flows. However, 
there is no consistent set of data on non-tariff barriers to imports available 
for a large sample of developing countries. The only relevant data available 
for nearly all countries are the amounts of government revenue from taxes 
on international transactions, published by the IMF. 
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3. THE SYNDROME OF PROTECTIONISM 
3.1 Introduction 
Some effects of protection on the performance of the economy have been 
studied in the previous section. The effects focused on follow in a straight-
forward fashion from the genera! equilibrium analysis of an economy. In this 
section we shall extend our analysis of the nature and manifestation of 
protection by exploring the relationship between protection and a number 
of selected variables' and by exploring the interrelations among these 
variables. 
3.2 Introduction to the selected variables 
The principal component analysis is based on a dataset compn'sing the following 
11 selected variables. 
VAR 01 the share of import duties in government revenue. 
VAR 02 the share of import duties and export taxes in government revenue. 
VAR 03 the share of manufactured exports in total exports. 
VAR 04 export concentration index. 
VAR 05 the share of manufactured value added in gross domestic product. 
VAR 06 impor t s per capita. 
VAR 07 e x p o r t s per capita. 
VAR 08 manufactured exports per capita. 
VAR 09 manufactured imports per capita. 
VAR 10 a proxy for the overvaluation of the exchange rate. 
VAR 11 balance of trade. 
The relationship between these aspects of the economie performance of 
countries and the trade regime wil! be discussed briefly below. 
Sources of government revenue (VAR 01, 02) 
We have already highlighted that governments in developing countries are 
more dependent on tariff revenue for their income than governments in 
developed countries are. Taxing imports may be part of a cost-efficient 
way of tax collecting as collection costs of alternative tax regimes may 
be considerable higher. A high dependence of governments on import taxes 
may be a serious obstacle to trade liberalization. In such cases, the develop-
ment of an alternative tax regime is a prerequisite for trade liberalization. 
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Governments in resource-rich countries have the additional option of taxing 
in a cost-efficient way primary exports. Governments in resource-poor 
countries, however, lack this option. In such countries foreign exchange 
has to be generated by non-traditional exports such as manufactures. To 
enhance the competitiveness of the export sector and to compensate for the 
stimuli given to domestic-market-oriented industries, export industries 
are stimulated by tariff rebating schemes and tax exemption schemes. 
The manufactured export sector is, consequently, not a major direct source 
of government revenue. Export taxes are important as a source of government 
revenue in resource-rich countries only. 
The diversification of the economy (VAR 03, 04, 05) 
Diversification and broadening the basis of the economy has often been used as 
a non-economic argument for protection. In most developing countries the 
net effective rate of protection for industrial activities exceeds by far- „ • 
the net effective rate of protection for non-industrial activities. In 
this way the system of protection tends to favour the use of domestic and 
foreign resources in industrial sectors over their use i-n other sectors. 
We expect this to be reflected in an increased share of protected industrial 
activities in total economie activities. Interestingly, Balassa found that 
within industry diversification increased significantly as a consequence 
of protection.9 His regression analysis shows that, given the leve! of 
development and the si ze of the economy, tariffs tend to reduce the degree 
of specialization within the manufacturing sector by inducing production 
in sectors in which the country is not yet internationally competitive. 
A system of (generalized) protection indicates a lack of international 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. Import barriers, in contrast 
to subsidies, favour production for the domestic market over export production. 
The diversified structure of production, induced by the import barriers, 
is not reflected in the export structure. Countries with a protectionist 
trade and industrialization regime will be more dependent on non-industrial 
exports than countries with a more open trade regime. We expect this to 
be reflected in the export concentration index. 
The market orientation of the economy (VAR 06, 07, 08, 09) 
No matter for what reason import barriers have been applied, they reduce 
the share of traded goods in production and consumption. The impact of trade 
policy on this aspect of the economie performance of the economy has aiready 
been discussed in the previous section. 
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Balance-of-payments position (VAR 10 , 11) 
An argument used for applying trade barriers is to reduce a trade deficit. 
Gatt rules allow intervention in the trade regime for this purpose and 
especially developing countries restrict imports with tariff and non-tariff 
barriers as part of external adjustment programmes. 
The exchange rate in many developing countries tends to be overvalued for 
several reasons that need not be discussed here. Such a situation stimulates 
imports and hampers exports. An overvalued exchange rate reduces the net 
effective rate of protection and may consequently be a strong argument for 
affected interest groups to lobby for higher barriers to imports. 
3.3 Protection and the performance of the economy 
Having introduced the variables that are used in the principal component 
analysis we shall proceed our study of the syndrome of protectionism' along 
the foilowing lines. First, we shall analyse the relationship between tariff 
protection and every individual original variable. Next, we shall explore 
the interrelations between the original variables, and reduce these variables 
to new composite variables. Finally, we shall analyse the relationship 
between the composite variables and tariff protection. 
3.3.1 Correlation between individual variables and tariff protection 
The ratio of total import duties to the value of total imports is taken as 
an indicator for protection. Table 3 shows the simpie correlation coefficients 
of economie performance by tariffs. 
The relationship between protection and the sources of government revenue 
(VAR 01, 02) is positive and strong: government in protectionist countries 
is relatively dependent on taxes on trade and especially on import duties. 
The relationship between protection and the contribution of manufactures 
to total exports (VAR 03) is as expected. However, the absolute value of 
the correlation coëfficiënt is rather low. 
The correlation between the export concentration index (VAR 04) and the 
leve! of tariffs is very low and not significantly different from zero. 
Indeed, the sign of the correlation coëfficiënt is negative, whereas a 
positive sign would have been expected. It can be shown that the negative 
sign can be ascribed to the inclusion of a smal! number of resource-rich 
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r df s 
.695 45 .001 
.470 45 .001 
-.122 45 ,415 
-.067 45 .657 
-.118 45 .424 
-.487 46 .001 
-.469 45 .001 
-.375 45 .009 
-.517 46 .001 
.313 45 .032 
-.323 45 .027 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients of indicators of economie performance 
by tariffs. 
Variatie 
VAR 01 import duties in government revenue 
VAR 02 import duties and export taxes in 
government revenue 
VAR 03 manufactured exports in total exports 
VAR 04 export concentration index 
VAR 05 manufactured value added in GDP 
VAR 06 imports per capita 
VAR 07 exports per capita 
VAR 08 manufactured exports per capita 
VAR 09 manufactured imports per capita 
VAR 10 overvalued exchange rate 
VAR 11 bafcmce of trade 
Notes: r = simple correlation coëfficiënt. 
df = degrees of freedom. 
s* = level of significance (two-tailed). 
All data refer to 1980. 
Sources: as of tables 1 and 2. 
countries (especially OPEC-countries) in our sample. These countries have an 
extremely high degree of concentration in exports and, at the same time, 
pursue a free trade regime as defined earlier. Exclusion of these countries 
results in a positive correlation between VAR 04 and protection, as wil! 
be shown at a later stage of the analysis. 
The relationship between tariff protection and the diversification of the 
economy (VAR 05) is not straightforward. There is a low and negative 
correlation between the share of the manufacturing sector in the economy 
and the level of protection which is contrary to what was expected. In 
another study of the impact of protection on the performance of the 
manufacturing sector, we have shown that there is no significant relationship 
between protection and the contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP 
(VAR 05), given the level of income per capita and the size of the domestic 
market. Also, there is no significant relationship between protection and 
the value of manufacturing production per capita. This has been found for 
samples including and excluding developed countries.10 However, there is a 
significant positive relationship between tariffs and the share of domestic 
supply in total demand (see table 2). 
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The impact of the trade regime on the size of the trade sector is significant: 
total and manufactured imports and exports (VAR 06 - 09) show a negative 
correlation with protection. 
The relationship between protection and the balance-of-payments position may 
be complicated. The overvaluation of the exchange rate is defined by 
(M-E)/M and the trade balance as (E-M)/(E+H),E being exports and M being 
imports. Conceived in this way, protectionist countries have an overvalued 
.exchange rate and a negative trade balance. In other words, there is a 
correlation between the level of protection and the lack of equilibrium 
in the trade balance. One should be careful in interpreting these results. 
Low income countries, in particular, have high taxes on imports and have 
large trade deficits at the same time. The partial coefficients of correlation 
for the tariff rate on VAR 10 and VAR 11 controling for GDP per capita are 
only .009 (s = .952) and -.116 (s = .444) respectively. This noints to a 
spurious relationship between the trade regime and the balance-of-payments 
situation. 
3.3.2 Interrelations between the variables 
Up to now we have studied only the pairwise correlation between the original 
data and the level of tariff protection. We shall proceed by exploring the 
interrelations between the original variables. By doing so we may depict 
the relationship between protection and the performance of the economy 
in a more comprehensive and consistent manner. The coefficients of correlation 
between the variables are presented in table 4. 
The correlation matrix is the start of the subsequent principal component 
analysis. Principal component analysis is a specific type of factor analysis. 
In contrast to 'other types of factor analysis, no assumptions are required 
with respect to the structure of the interrelations between the variables. 
Principal component analysis does not add information to the data, it is 
rather a new way of looking at the data. The aim is data reduction by 
transforming the observed variables into a new set of variables which will 
be pairwise uncorrelated (orthogonal). The first of these variables nas 
the maximum possible variance, the second the maximum possible variance 
among those uncorrelated with the first, and so on. These new uncorrelated 
(= orthogonal) variables can subsequently be used for further analysis. 
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Table 4. Correlations between variables on the economie performance. 
VAR 01 VAR 02 VAR 03 VAR 04 VAR 05 VAR 06 VAR 07 VAR 08 VAR 09 VAR 10 VAR 11 
VAR 01 1 .78 .07 -.10 -.13 -.35 -.44 -.24 -.38 .51 -.48 
VAR 02 1 -.02 -.12 -.04 -.42 -.48 -.30 -.46 .44 -.35 
VAR 03 1 -.54 + .54 -.11 -.07 .37 .18 .31 -.31 
VAR 04 1 -.59 .19 .32 -.07 .18 -.48 .41 
VAR 05 1 .17 -.07 .29 .12 .26 -.11 
VAR 06 1 .85 .72 .94 -.23 .22 
VAR 07 1 .61 .89 -.55 .46 
VAR 08 1 .86 -.19 .15 
VAR 09 1 -.34 .28 
VAR 10 1 -.94 
VAR 11 1 
There are as many principal components as there are original variables. 
However, only some of the principal components wil! contributé a substantial 
proportion to the variance in the original data. It can be shown that the 
contribution of a principal component to the total variation in the data is 
proportionate to its corresponding eigenvalue. This is illustrated in table 5. 
The first factor accounts for 4.632/11 = 42.1 per cent of the total variance. 
The second and third factors account for 24.9 and 12.7 per cent respectively. 
These three factors alone account for 79.9 per cent of the total variance. 
All other factors have ei genvalues below 1 and are excluded from further 
analysis. 
Table 5. Eigenvalue and share in variance of 11 factors. 
Factor Eigenvalue Share in 
variance 
Cumulative 
share 
(%} 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
4.632 
2.742 
1.394 
.817 
.495 
.360 
.264 
.184 
.084 
.018 
.008 
42.1 
24.9 
12.7 
7.4 
4.5 
3.3 
2.4 
1.7 
.8 
.2 
.1 
42.1 
67.0 
79.7 
87.1 
91.6 
94.9 
97.3 
99.0 
99.8 
99.9 
100.0 
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Table 6. Factor matrix for three factors. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Communality 
VAR 01 -.660 .064 .602 .803 
VAR 02 -.680 -.008 .456 .670 
VAR 03 -.060 .798 -.154 .665 
VAR 04 .366 -.696 .376 .760 ' 
VAR 05 •-.003 .737 -.412 .713 
VAR 06 .814 .353 .339 .902 
VAR 07 .907 .053 .255 .890 
VAR 08 .668 .554 .228 .805 
VAR 09 .874 .361 .313 .992 
VAR 10 -.700 .524 .248 .826 
VAR 11 .641 -.485 -.312 .744 
In order to attach a concrete meaning to the composite factors, it is assumed 
that these factors represent a number of latent variables, that account for 
most of the correlation between the observed variables. Therefore, we shall 
inspect the correlation coefficients between the observed variables and the 
composite factors. These correlation coefficients or factor loadings are 
represented in table 6. The table also shows the communality of the variables, 
i.e. the share of the variance in the original variables that can be 
attributed to the principal components. The communality equals the sum of 
the squared factor loadings. Thus, the variance of VAR 01 that is accounted 
for by the three selected factor is: (-.660)2 + (.064)2 + (.602)2 = ,803. 
The relationship between the original variables and the three composite 
variables does not follow straightforward from the factor matrix. For 
instance, there is not much difference in the loading of VAR 06 on Factor 02 
or Factor 03. This hampers an economically meaningful interpretation of the 
composite factors. The interpretation of the factors can be facilitated by 
factor rotation. By rotating the factor axes the relative positions of the 
variables with respect to each other remain unchanged. Only the positions 
of the variables in the factor space with respect to the factor axes are 
changed. The aim of factor rotation is to achieve that each variable loads 
high (close to 1 or -1) on one of the composite factors and low on all 
other composite factors. This is illustrated for the case of two variables 
and two factors in figure 2. The rotation technique applied is VARIMAX 
rotation which is an orthogonal rotation technique. 
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Figure 2. The loading pattern before and after orthogonal factor rotation. 
factor 2 
(unrotated) 
factor 2 
(rotated) 
VAR. 
•z. 
factor 3 
(unrotated) 
VAR. 3 
factor 3 
(rotated) 
After rotation the factor matrix shows a distinct pattern of loadings. 
After rearranging the order of the variables according to the loading 
pattern we find three groups of variables (see table 7). 
VAR 09, 06, 08 and 07 load highest on PCI and are all related to the trade 
orientation of the economy. Hence we name PC2 trade orientation. 
VAR 01, 10, 02 and 11 load highest on PC2. While VAR 01 and 02 are related 
to government revenues from trade, VAR 10 and 11 are related to the overall 
balance in the economy's revenues from trade. In a later stage of the 
analysis it wil! be shown that these are two separate dimensions, loading 
on two distinguishable principal components. We label PC2 revenues from 
trade. 
VAR 04, 05 and 03 load highest on PC3 and are all related to diversification 
in production and exports. Hence its name: diversification. 
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Table 7. VARIMAX rotated factor matrix. 
PCI PC2 PC3 
VAR 09 manufactured imports per capita 
VAR 06 imports per capita 
VAR 08 manufactured exports per capita 
VAR 07 exports per capita 
VAR 01 import duties in government revenue 
VAR 10 overvalued exchange rate 
VAR 02 import duties and export taxes in 
government revenue 
VAR 11 balance of trade 
VAR 04 export concentration index 
VAR 05 manufactured value added in GDP 
VAR 03 manufactured exports in total exports 
.97 - .22 .02 
.93 - .17 .01 
.85 - .10 .26 
.84 - .37 - .22 
.17 .87 - .12 
.19 .77 .45 
.29 .76 - .11 
.13 - .76 - .38 
.18 - .15 - .84 
.10 - .10 .83 
.21 .15 .77 
3.3.3 Relationship between composite variables and protection 
The last step in the analysis is to sturiythe relationship between the three 
extracted principal components and the rate of protection. The correlation 
coefficients of the principal components by tariffs are presented in table 8. 
Table 8(1) may be envisaged as an aggregated presentation of table 3 in 
which the correlation coefficients of the 11 original variables on tariffs 
are presented. It follows that there is a straightforward relationship 
between protection and trade orientation and between protection and revenue 
from trade. However, there is no such clear relationship between protection-
and diversification, as discussed earlier. The countries included in the 
sample differ widely according to their structural characteristics such 
as level of development and natura! resource endowment. Such structural 
characteristics may be correlated to the variables on economie performance 
of countries and on government behaviour. For instance, both the market 
orientation of the manufacturing sector and the tariff rates may be correlated 
to the overall level of development of the economy. 
In table 8(2) we analyse the correlation between the three principal components 
and the tariff rate controlling for the level of development. The results 
confirm earlier findings but there is a change in the level of significance 
of the correlations. 
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Table 8. Correlation coefficients of principal components by tariffs. 
(1) Correlation coefficients of principal components by tariffs 
r df s 
-.391 44 .007 
.484 44 .001 
-.117 44 .440 
(2) Correlation coefficients of principal components by tariffs 
controlling for GDP/P 
r df s 
PCI trade orientation -.181 43 .235 
PC2 revenues from trade .351 43 .018 
PC3 diversification -.209 43 .167 
(3) Correlation coefficients of principal components by tariffs 
controlling foc natural resource endowment 
r df s 
.374 43 .011 
.444 43 .002 
.348 43 .019 
In table 8(3) correlations between composite indicators for the economie 
performance and tariffs are presented, controlling for the natural resource 
endowment. There is, indeed, correlation between natural resource endowment 
and diversification. In our sample, this correlation is due to a \/ery 
large extent to a group of natural resource-rich countries specialised 
in primary exports. Nearly all of these countries are OPEC countries with 
a high concentration in exports and low tariff rates on imports. All imports 
can be financed by primary exports and consequently there is no need for 
additional foreign exchange revenue from manufactured exports. Tariffs on 
imports are not required for government finance purposes or the protection 
of import-substituting industries. 
As will be shown in the next section these countries differ significantly 
from all other countries in our sample according to their economie 
performance as envisaged here. For that reason, this group of countries 
will be excluded from the sample in the subsequent analysis of the syndrome 
of protection, to be presented in section 6. 
PCI trade orientation 
PC2 revenues from trade 
PC3 diversification 
PCI trade orientation 
PC2 revenues from trade 
PC3 diversification 
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4'. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR LIBERALIZATION 
4.1 Introduction 
Next step in our study of the syndrome of protectionism i's to investigate 
how countries score on the principal components that have been extracted 
from the 11 original variables, and to group countries according to their 
scoring. As indicated already in the introduction to this study, the 
assumption here is that there is a straightforward relationship between 
the actual economie performance of countries, as indicated by the factor 
score matrix in table 9, and their capacity or propensity to liberalize 
the trade regime. The more a country's economie performance is characterized 
by protection, the stronger resistance to liberalization will be. 
4.2 Factor scores of countries 
The scores of countries on principal component 1, the most general component 
that is extracted from variables on the trade orientation of the economy, 
show that small (island) economies and some OPEC countries are extremely 
dependent on foreign trade. The OPEC countries have an open trade regime 
and a small public sector according to the measures applied here, while 
the small economies in the sample generally pursue a moderate trade policy. 
For these countries it is true that they are heavily dependent on foreign 
markets and on an open world trade system. 
To classify countries in terms of their propensity to liberalize, we shall 
first distinguish countries that have a high dependence on tariffs for 
government revenue purposes and balance-of-trade assistance and, at the 
same time, have a low degree of diversification. Countries that are dependent 
on tariffs as a source of government revenue (VAR 01, 02) and that have 
an unfavourable balance-of-payments position (VAR 10, 11) score high on 
principal component 2. We expect such countries to be reluctant to reduce 
tariffs. Countries with a low degree of diversification in production and 
export score low on principal component 3. It seems likely that in such 
countries there is no widespread lobby of exporting industries that favours 
liberalization. Such countries may not be in a strong position to gain 
from liberalization in partner countries. 
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Table 9. Factor score matrix. 
PCI PC2 PC3 
Argentina -.649 -1.126 1.311 
Bahrain 3.103 -.480 -.993 
Barbados .609 . .926 .489 
Brazil -.804 -1.500 1.466 
Burundi -.063 1.282 -1.394 
Congo -.589 -1.719 -1.611 
Costa Rica -.280 -.327 .675 
Cyprus .462 .490 1.109 
Dominican Republic -.215 .868 -.322 
El Salvador -.397 .089 .255 
Fiji .141 .975. -1.271 
Guatemala -.504 -.286 .233 
Honduras -.314 - .482 -.334 
Indonesia -.954 -2.166 -.557 
Jordan .122 1.351 .229 
Kenya -.397 .210 -.108 
Korea Republic -.216 -.625 2.154 
Kuwait 2.598 -2.204 -1.733 
Liberia -.240 .548 -1.316 
Malawi -.438 .047 -.354 
Malaysia -.261 -.387 .270 
Malta 1.386 .965 1.845 
Mexico -.496 -.491 .084 
Morocco -.389 .142 .391 
Nepal -.296 .687 .107 
Nicaragua -.315 .302 .476 
Niger -.100 1.044 -1.764 
Oman .205 -1.756 -1.845 
Pakistan -.154 1.133 .455 
Panama -.260 .094 .229 
Paraguay -.454 .024 -.072 
Peru -.670 -.762 .655 
Philippines -.459 .101 .743 
Senegal -.130 1.427 -.167 
Singapore 4.399 .004 1.720 
23 
(TabIe 9 continued) 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
U.R. of Cameroon 
U.R. of Tanzania 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
PCI PC2 PC3 
.284 .864 -.055 
.049 1.813 -1.126 
.445 .087 .625 
.233 .736 -.766 
'.358 -1.164 -.641 
.032 .578 -.144 
.650 -.769 1.275 
.238 .932 -.986 
.547 -.139 .188 
.354 -.473 1.226 
.510 -1.828 -.651 
Note: Factor scores are calculated for each case according to 
fi = fsc . z + fsc z + fscii • zii w n e r e fsc., is the factor-score 
coëfficiënt for variable j and factor i and z . is the case's 
standardized value on variable j. 
The positions of countries according to their scores on theprincipal 
components are plotted in figure 3. On the Y-axes are the scores on 
principal component 2, on the X-axes the scores on principal component 3, 
Countries that score high on principal component 2 and low on principal 
component 3 are situated in quadrant 2. 
The following countries are in quadrant 2: 
Burundi Niger 
Dominican Republic Paraguay 
Fiji Senegal 
Honduras Sri Lanka 
Kenya Sudan 
Liberia Togo 
Malawi Tunisia 
U.R. of Cameroon. 
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Figure 3. Scores on PC2 and PC3. 
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Apart from the Dominican Republic, Fiji, Paraguay and Tunisia, the countries 
in this sample are low-income countries, i.e. countries with a leve! of GDP 
per capita bel OW US $ 1000. 
Burundi, Malawi, Niger, Sudan and Togo even belong' to the group of least 
developed countries. It is striking that the countries in this group except 
Fiji not only score high on principal component 2 and low on principal 
component 3, but also score low on principal component 1. This combination 
of factor scores indicates a low propensity to liberalize. 
Countries that score low on principal component 2 and high on principal 
component 3 are expected to experience less difficulty with liberalization, 
as they appear to be better equipped for such a change in economie policy. 
The following countries are in quadrant 4: 
Argentina Malaysia 
Brazil Mexico 
Costa Rica Peru 
Guatemala Turkey 
Korea Republic U.R. of Tanzania 
Uruguay 
Except for Tanzania all countries in this group are at levels of GDP per 
capita above US $ 1000. Additionally, nearly all countries in this group 
have a relatively large domestic market: the GDP of these countries exceeds 
10 billion US dollar. Only Costa Rica and Tanzania have a smal! domestic 
market: the GDP of these countries is less than 5 billion US dollar. 
Next we may distinguish countries that score low on principal components 
2 and 3. Such countries are not dependent on tariffs for government revenue 
purposes and do not have an unfavourable balance-of-payments situation 
but their economy, and especially their export sector, is not well diversified. 
We expect that these countries are relatively well equipped to liberalize 
but it is not quite clear how liberalization in partner countries wil! 
affect their highly specialized export sector. 
The following countries are in quadrant 3: 
Bahrain Kuwait 
Congo Oman 
Indonesia Trinidad 
Venezuela 
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This group includes major oil-exporting countries (OPEC members) some of 
which have a free-trade regime and all of which have an export sector which 
is dominated by oil and oil products. Congo has also an extremely con-
centrated export sector. Trinidad shows an extremely low contribution of 
manufactures to total exports. 
Finally we have a group of countries in quadrant 1. These countries score 
high on both principal components and are therefore not easy to be classified. 
Barbados Nepal 
Cyprus Nicaragua 
El Salvador Pakistan 
Jordan Panama 
Malta Philippines 
Morocco Singapore 
Thailand 
By analyzing more closely the relative positions of the countries in 
this group, we may try to distinguish countries that score high on principal 
component 3 and low on 2 from countries that score low on principal component 3 
and high on 2. While the first group shows more resemblence to countries 
in quadrant 4, the latter resembles more closely the countries in quadrant 2. 
It then follows that Singapore does have a favourable export structure 
which is a very substantial part of the economy, as indicated by principal 
component 1. 
Cyprus and Malta also show scores on principal components 2 and 3 as wel! 
as 1 that indicate a wel! developed capacity to liberalize. This does not 
hold so much for countries such as El Salvador, Panama, the Philippines 
and Thailand. 
Along the other axes we may find countries like Jordan and Pakistan. These 
countries score very high on principal component 2 and may not be so much 
inclined to liberalize. 
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5. THE PERFORMANCE OF LARGE COUNTRIES AND LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES 
Many attempts have been made to liberalize the trade and industrialization 
regime, but in many a country such attempts have failed. Liberalization 
attempts have been made by individual countries and also in a co-ordinated 
way by groups of countries through the establishment of preferential trading 
areas. An ambitious attempt to co-ordinate liberalization efforts in 
developing countries has been undertaken under the auspices of GATT, 
supported and co-serviced by UNCTAD, in the early 1970s. A new effort has 
been made by UNCTAD since 1976 to implement a Global System of Trade 
Preferences among developing countries. Wide differenees among countries 
in economie capabilities, pursued economie policies and negotiating strength 
complicate the negotiations that have been inconsequential up to now. 
Ultimately, the positions that countries are likely to take in the negotia-
tion process are determined by the expectations aboüt their net gains from 
liberalization. The more a country has a competitive and diversified 
economy, the more it is likely to gain from concessions of partner countries. 
Countries with balance-of-payments problems or a heavy dependence on taxes 
on trade to finance the public sector and protect industry are probably 
reluctant to liberalize. 
The si ze of the domestic market and the competitiveness of domestic industry 
are major sources of power when it comes to negotiating reductions in trade 
barriers. Countries with an import-capacity-based bargaining power and 
competitiveness-based bargaining power may dominate negotiations by compelling 
concessions via reciprocity. 
In the real negotiations, therefore, concessions are spelled out by an inner 
group of countries with strong bargaining positions. As Cline puts it 
"(s)ome argue that in economie terms MFN has in practice been conditional be-
cause the products submitted for tariff liberalization nave systematically been 
selected such that they came primariiy from countries that offered tariff con-
cessions in return, and tariff cuts might have been more limited had this 
not been the case".11 
Countries with a smal! domestic market and an industry that is not 
sufficiently competitive are in a weak bargaining position. They have no 
substantial concessions to offer to trading partners and are not able to 
take advantage of the opening, up of foreign markets. Therefore, equal rules 
for unequal partners in the negotiations may be an insufficiënt offer to be 
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acceptable for the countries least equipped for liberalization. Additional 
preferential treatment, exceptions to the reciprocity rule, and financial 
support to assist restructuring and to facilitate liberalization may be required 
to make such countries participate in the trade liberalization rounds. 
Such measures, it is suggested, should be part of the proposals for a GSTP.12 
In brief, for the GSTP to be substantial, countries with a large domestic 
market and a potentially large demand for imports should participate. For 
the GSTP to-be general, the rule system should include specific measures 
that take into account the difficulties for the countries that are the least 
equipped to liberalize. 
To investigate the capacity to liberalize of the two groups of countries 
referred to above, we have applied discriminant analysis. 
Table 10 presents the results of the discriminant analysis on small and 
large countries and table 11 presents the results of the analysis on low-
and middle-income countries. The tables show the group means, group Standard 
deviations, the discriminant function coefficients and the rank of entrance 
of the discriminating variables used in the discriminant functions, and 
finally the classification results. 
From table 10 it follows that the group of large countries as compared to the 
group of small countries scores low on PCI, low on PC2 and high on PC3. If the 
group scores on PC2 and PC3 were to be plotted in figure 3, the scores of 
large countries would be in quadrant 4 and the scores of small countries 
in quadrant 2. As indicated by the discriminant function coefficients, 
large countries, as compared to small countries, are distinct in having a 
more favourable structure of government revenue and a more favourable 
balance-of-payments position (PC2), and a more diversified structure of 
production and exports (PC3). 
The classification results show the capability of the discriminant function 
to discriminate correctly, which follows from a comparison of the actual 
group memberships with the predicted group membership. The statistical 
chance for correct classification in a two-way division, of course, is 
50 per cent. The classification results show that the discriminant function 
on small and large countries classifies 71.74 per cent of all cases 
correctly. 
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Table 10. Discriminant analysis, small and large countries. 
Group means: PCI PC'2 
Small countries .040 .440 
Large countries -.037 -.403 
Group Standard deviations: 
Smallcountries .816 .725 
Large countries 1.160 1.059 
Discriminant function coefficients: .929 
Rank of entrance: 1 
Classification resuits: 
Actual group 
Small countries 
Large countries 
Percentage of cases correctly classified: 71.74 
The resuits presented in table 11 show that low-income countries have an 
unfavourable economie performance as compared to middle income countries: 
they score low on PCI, high on PC2 and low on PC3. Scores of low-income 
countries on PC2 and PC3 put them in quadrant 2 in figure 4, 
while middle-income countries were to be put in quadrant 4. As follows 
from the discriminant function coefficients, low-income countries have a 
less favourable structure of government revenue and a less favourable 
balance-of-payments position (PC2), a less diversified economie structure 
(PC3) and a less marked trade orientation (PCI). The classification resuits 
show that the discriminant function is capabie of classifying 78.26 per cent 
of the countries correctly. 
PC3 
- .204 
.187 
.918 
1.054 
- .468 
2 
to. of cases Predicted group membersfnp 
Small countries Large countries 
22 15 7 
24 6 18 
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Tabie 11. Discriminant analysis, low- and middie-income countries. 
Group means: 
Low-income countries 
Middie-income countries 
PCI 
.314 
.288 
PC2 
.421 
•.386 
PC3 
.321 
.294 
Group Standard deviatïons: 
Low-income countries 
Middie-income countries 
Discriminant function coefficients: 
Rank of entrance: 
Classification results: 
.225 .933 .763 
1.315 .915 1.111 
.605 -.777 .618 
3 1 2 
Actual group 
Low-income countries 
Middie-income countries 
No. of cases 
22 
24 
Predicted group membership 
Low income Middle income 
18 4 
6 18 
Percentage of cases correctly classified 78.26 
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6. CONTROLLING FOR EXCEPTIONAL NATURAL WEALTH 
6.1 Introduction 
The sample of 46 countries on which the previous analysis has been based 
includes a group of countries with huge natural resources. Such countries 
are in a position to finance their entire imports by exporting unprocessed 
natural products. Thus, these countries have a trade surplus and a yery 
1ow export diversification. Also, they are often outward oriented and do 
not need import duties to finance government expenditure. Our analysis of 
protection and economie performance may have been biased by these countries 
with an exceptional natural wealth. In this section we shall exclude from 
the analysis countries in which the value of primary exports exceeds the 
value of total imports. 
The following countries have been excluded: 
Bahrain Oman 
Congo Peru 
Indonesia Trinidad 
Kuwait Venezuela 
Liberia. 
These are mainly OPEC countries that have an export sector dominated by 
oil. Liberia, Congo and Trinidad also have an exceptionally high product 
concentration in the export sector. In Peru, however, the sector is somewhat 
more diversified. It should be noted that most of these countries do not 
need import duties to finance government expenditure. 
Factor analysis and discriminant analysis have been applied on the reduced 
sample excluding these resource-rich countries. Rather than presenting all 
results, we shall highlight only the major findings and compare them with 
the findings of the previous analyses. 
6.2 Correlation between individual variables and protection 
The correlation coefficients indicate a strong positive relationship between 
tariffs and the share of taxes on trade in government finance (VAR 01, 02), 
a consistent negative relation between tariffs and diversification in 
production and exports (VAR 03, 04,-05), a strong and negative relation 
between tariffs and the foreign trade orientation of the economy (VAR 06, 
07, 08, 09), a positive relation between tariffs and the overvaluation of 
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the exchange rate (VAR 10) and a negative relation between tan'ffs and the 
trade balance position (VAR 11). Thus, by excluding from the sample countries 
with exceptional national wealth, the relationship between protection and 
economie performance has become clearer, and confirms our prior expectations. 
6.3 Interrelations between the variables 
The correlation matrix is presented in tab!e 12. There are some differences 
between this matrix and the correlation matrix in tab!e 4 but the underlving 
causes of these differences are hard to tracé. 
Table 12. Correlation between variables on the economie performance. 
VAR01 VAR02 VAR03 VAR04 VAR05 VAR06 VAR07 VAR08 VAR09 VAR10 VAR 11 
VAR 01 1 .66 -.12 .38 -.44 -.22 -.25 -.21 -.21 .20 -.20 
VAR 02 1 -.28 .44 -.39 -.32 -.30 -.30 -.31 -.17 .15 . 
VAR 03 1 -.47 .56 .39 .30 .43 .42 .05 -.04 
VAR 04 1 -.50 -.14 -.15 -.17 -.14 .09 -.10 
VAR 05 1 .41 .42 .46 .41 -.34 .36 
VAR 06 1 .98 .98 .99 -.08 .06 
VAR 07 1 .98 .97 -.20 .19 
VAR 08 1 .98 -.13 .13 
VAR 09 1 -.06 .05 
VAR 10 1 -.98 
VAR 11 1 
By applying principal component analysis the interreiatedness among the 
original variables is revealed. Four factor can be extracted that have 
corresponding eigenvalues larger than 1 as shown in table 13. 
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Table 13. Eigenvalue and share in variance of 11 factors, 
Factor Eigenvalue Share in Cumulatïve 
variance share 
(%) (%) 
44.4 44.4 
19.5 63.9 
17.2 81.2 
9.5 90.6 
4.1 9.4.8 
2.6 97.4 
2.2 99.6 
.2 99.8 
.1 99.9 
.1 100.0 
.0 100.0 
Factor .1 4.886 
Factor 2 2.147 
Factor 3 1.894 
Factor 4 1.043 
Factor 5 .455 
Factor 6 .288 
Factor 7 .242 
Factor 8 .026 
Factor 9 .013 
Factor 10 .006 
Factor 11 .001 
These four factors account for 90.6 per cent of the total variance in our 
data set. As a consequence, the communality of the variables is generally 
higher in this analysis than in our previous analysis, in which the common 
share in the variance accounted for 79.7 per cent. After factor rotation 
we find a distinct pattern of loadings and four rather than three groups 
of variables can now be distinguished according to their loading pattern. 
Table 14 shows the varimax rotated factor matrix after rearranging the 
order of the variables according to the loading pattern. 
VAR 06, 08, 08 and 09 load highest on PCI and are all related to the trade 
orientation of the economy. 
VAR 10 and 11 load highest on PC2, the balance-of-payments position. 
VAR 03, 04 and 05 load highest on PC3, diversification of the economy. 
VAR 01 and 02 load highest on PC4, the sources of government revenue. 
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Table 14. Varimax rotated factor matrix, 
PCI PC2 PC3 PC4 
VAR 06' imports per capita .98 .01 .13 -.11 
VAR 07 manufactured imports per capita .98 -.01 .16 -.09 
VAR 08 manufactured exports per capita .97 .07 .19 -.09 
VAR 09 exports per capita .97 .14 .08 -.14 
VAR 10 overvalued exchange rate -.06 -.99 -.03 .01 
VAR 11 balance of trade .05 .99 .05 -.01 
VAR 03 manufactured exports in total 
exports .30 -.12 .86 .06 
VAR 04 export concentration index .03 -.06 -.75 .38 
VAR 05 manufactured value added in GDP .30 .34 .68 -.30 
VAR 01 import duties in govemment 
revenue -.10 -.20 -.11 .90 
VAR 02 import duties and export taxes 
in government revenue -.21 .23 -.25 .84 
6.4 Relationship between composite variables and protection 
Table 15 shows the relationship between the extracted principal components 
and protection. As shown, protectionist countries are generally dependent 
on taxes on international trade to finance the public sector; they have a 
reduced trade orientation and, to a lesser extent, they have a high con-
centration in production and export. Finally, they have an unfavourable 
balance-of-payments position. 
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Table 15. Correlation coefficients of principal components by tariffs. 
(1) Correlation coefficients of principal components bg tariffs 
r df s 
PCI trade orientation -.279 35 .094 
PC2 balance-of-payments -.067 35 .697 
PC3 diversification -.142 35 .402 
PC4 government revenue .844 35 .001 
Correlation coefficients of principal components by tariffs 
controlling for GDP/P 
r df s 
PCI trade orientation -.184 34 .282 
PC2 balance-of-payments -.043 34 .802 
PC3 diversification -.049 34 .776 
•PC4 government revenue .835 34 .001 
6.5 Factor score matrix 
The factor score matrix is presented in table 16. As compared with the factor 
score matrix given in table 9, the former factor PC2 - representing both 
government revenue from international trade and the balance-of-payments 
position - is split into two separate factors PC2 (balance-of-payments 
position) and PC4 (government revenue). It is noteworthy that PC2 and PC4 
have quite frequently different signs, indicating for instance a deficit 
on the balance-of-payments (PC2 < 0) and a high dependence on duties to 
finance government expenditure (PC4 > 0). Such positions could not be 
disentangled in the previous analysis, in which both effects were combined, 
resulting in a low positive or negative factor score. 
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Tab! e 16. Factor score matrix. 
PCI PC2 PC3 PC4 
Argentina -.494 .900 1.047 -.130 
Barbados .603 -1.775 .209 -.201 
Brazil -.692 .823 .889 -1.540 
Burundi .104 -.960 -2.018 .576 
Costa Rica -.178 .158 .189 -1.125 
Cyprus .440 -.900 1.094 -.129 
Dominican Republic -. 158 -.288 -.440 .466 
El Salvador -.415 .441 -.038 -1.291 
Fiji .417 -.428 -2.116 -.096 
Guatemala -.428 1.408 -.017 -.795 
Honduras -.256 .897 -.497 -.432 
Jordan .025 -2.273 .173 .281 
Kenya -.315 -.408 -.572 -.505 
Korea Republic -.283 .711 2.418 -.011 
Malawi -.281 .136 -.944 -. 398 
Malaysia -.049 2.437 .090 -.342 
Malta 1.348 -.687 2.117 1.151 
Mexico -.268 .969 -.713 -1.061 
Morocco -.333 .058 .371 .606 
Nepal -.336 -.836 .180 .692 
Nicaragua -.238 -.348 .149 -.286 
Niger .142 1.690 -1.969 1.436 
Pakistan -.297 -.410 1.197 1.877 
Panama -.184 -1.930 -.711 -1.750 
Paraguay -.300 .347 -.422 .207 
Philippines -.435 .653 .881 .368 
Senegal -.188 -.365 .372 1.792 
Singapore 5.488 .677 .011 -.871 
Sri Lanka -.329 -.333 -.170 -.508 
Sudan -.043 -.715 -.760 2.264 
Thailand -.444 .409 .654 -.118 
Togo -.145 .070 -1.005 .255 
Tunisia .057 .225 -.148 .990 
Turkey -.605 -1.048 .598 -1.526 
U.R. of Cameroon -.149 1.244 -.796 1.235 
Tanzania -.509 -.906 -.473 -1.430 
Uruguay -.268 .359 1.170 .349 
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Table 17. Discriminant analysis, small and large countries 
Group means: 
Small countries 
Large countries 
PCI 
.015 
.016 
PC2 
.421 
.445 
PC3 
-.309 
.327 
PC4 
.066 
.070 
Group Standard deviations: 
Small countries 
Large countries 
Discriminant function coefficients: 
Rank of entrance: 
Classification results: 
,450 .971 1.04.6 .952 
1.379 .844 .860 1.072 
.863 .668 
1 2 
Actual group No. of cases 
Small countries 19 
Large countries 18 
Predicted group membership 
small countries large countries 
13 
4 
6 
14 
Percentage of cases correctly classified: 72.97 
Now that four common factors have been extracted, it is difficult to visualize 
in scatterplots the positions of countries according to their capacity to 
liberalize. Therefore we shall proceed directly with the formal discriminant 
analysis. 
The results of the discriminant analysis on small and large countries, 
presented in table 17, indicate that large countries have a more favourable 
balance-of-payments position (PC2) and a more diversified economy (PC3) 
which are positive conditions for a liberalization effort. 
Discrimination analysis on low- and middle-income countries, presented in 
table 18, shows that low-income countries are dependent on taxes on trade 
for government revenue (PC4), are less diversified (PC3) and are less trade 
oriented (PCI). These countries are in a more difficult position to 
implement liberalization. This may warrant to offer them a preferential 
position in any rule system to be established. 
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Table 18. Discriminant analysis, low- and middle-income countries, 
Group means: 
Low-income countries 
Middle-income countries 
PCI 
.234 
.247 
PC2 
.103 
.109 
PC3 
-.277 
.292 
PC4 
.338 
-.356 
Group Standard deviations: 
Low-income countries 
Middle-income countries 
Discriminant function coefficients: 
Rank of entrance: 
Classification results: 
.184 .902 .864 1.038 
1.399 1.110 1.073 .845 
.535 .625 -.745 
3 2 1 
Actual group 
Low-income countries 
Middle-income countries 
No. of cases 
19 
18 
Percentage of cases correctly classified 
Predicted group membership 
Low income Middle income 
13 
4 
6 
14 
72.97 
Finally, a general observation is in place regarding the adequacy of our 
approach of country's capacity to liberalize. This capacity has been inferred 
from variables, or composite variables, that are related to the actual 
economie performance of countries. The assumption of a straightforward 
relationship between economie performance and positions that are taken in 
international negotiations on trade liberalization is a simplification of 
reality. At best the approach gives indications for likely starting 
positions of countries in negotiations to the extent that such positions 
are determined by economie performance criteria. The process of policy 
making, however, is complex and decisions are not based solely on macro-
economie criteria. 
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NOTES 
1
 J.N. Bhagwati, 1978; A.O. Krueger, 1978. 
2
 For a review of arguments in favour or against simulation through 
protection see W.M. Corden, 1974. 
3
 A.O. Krueger, 1974; T.N. Srinivasan, 1985 
k
 J.N. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan, 1983, pp. 237, 238. < 
5
 W.M. Corden, 1974, pp. 77-87. 
6
 J.D. Richardson, 1980, pp. 319-336. 
7
 W.M. Corden, 1974, pp. 318-322; R.E. Baldwin, 1982, pp. 263-286. 
8
 See H. Chenery and M. Syrquin, 1975. 
9
 B. Balassa, 1976, p. 15. 
10
 P. van Dijck, 1986, pp. 89 and 90. 
11
 W.R. Cline, 1983, p. 133. 
1 2 
For a discussicm of proposals for a GSTP see P. van Dijck, 1987. 
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